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STACKED JURIES: A PROBLEM OF
MILITARY INJUSTICE
"The right to trial by individuals selected at random, some of whom
may possess attitudes and prior experiences similar to those of the accused,
is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence."'
Since the founding of the Republic nearly 200 years ago, one of
the most flagrant contradictions in American jurisprudence has been
the dissimilarity in selection of members of courts-martial and
civilian juries. Under the latter system, the defendant is constitu-
tionally guaranteed a fair trial by jurors drawn from a cross-section
of the community wherein the offense was committed.2 In a court-
martial, however, by the authority of Article 25' of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, the serviceman is tried by a panel of
court members arbitrarily selected by a convening authority,
usually the base commander, who is also responsible for convening
the trial. The result is undeniably a hand-picked jury.
Scholars have long debated the underlying concepts of the
system of military justice. But particular emphasis has seldom been
laid on the justice meted out through the practice of packing the
jury under the auspices of Article 25. And, of those who have
discussed the matter, too many have either voiced approval or
disapproval of the selection process without considering workable
alternatives. As a trend, apologists have usually based their argu-
ments on the need to maintain a high degree of discipline within the
armed forces. This position has obviously been met with pleasure
by military officials who generally submit that any procedure of
courts-martial must strike a balance between justice and discipline
to insure the proper attainment of military goals.4 On the other
hand, critics such as Senator Birch Bayh, noting a swiftly changing
American legal structure, contend that four million soldiers, most of
whom will never see combat, should be assured a fair trial by more
enlightened methods of selecting court members.5
During recent years, a barrage of politically-oriented military
cases has swamped the courts-martial, distinctively illuminating the
problem of command influence in appointing court members.6 For
1 116 CONG. Rc. 10,442 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1970).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
s 10 U.S.C. § 825, as amended (1968).
4 R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC,
ch. 3 (1969) (hereinafter cited simply as SHERRILL).
5 116 CONG. REc., 10,438 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1970).
6 See generally, SHRRuxL.
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the reformers, the exposure seems to have generated sympathy from
an American public that has viewed with growing distaste a process
by which 94 percent' of its sons are convicted by hand-picked juries.
Moreover, and as a possible result, an increasing number of civilian
attorneys are entering the arena to represent military clients charged
with everything from "mutiny" at San Francisco to "murder" in
Vietnam. The response from the military no doubt is equally
energetic, especially with respect to aggravating comments on the
issue of stacked juries. Typical was the criticism of Boston attorney
F. Lee Bailey representing one of the Song My defendants:
On the outside, we pull a jury from the streets and put them back there
after trial. In the case of military justice, the commander who orders
the trial-a guy who is himself convinced that there are good grounds
for conviction-selects the jury. And if the case is a heavy one, the
officer in the jury sits there and reflects on his career in the military.
He says 'If I do justice, my conscience will feel better for a couple of
days, but that son of a gun, the presiding officer, is going to remember
me for years.'8
Clearly, the present method of selecting members of courts-
martial does not provide an accused a fair and impartial trial. This
comment will explore the background of that system, the ancillary
issues appurtenant to any precise analysis of the problem, and the
alternative proposals available. Basically, these alternatives are all
variations of the concept of random selection. Nonetheless, a
thorough examination of these proposals discloses some inherent
differences in them. Analysis should reveal which of these are
suitable substitutes. In general, this comment suggests that a
random selection of court members might serve to satisfy the
requirements of both justice and discipline within the military
command.
THE COMPOSITION OF COURTS-MARTIAL-PAST AND PRESENT
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), enacted by
Congress in 1950, is said to be the most enlightened set of military
laws ever written.' Despite the one revision in 1968,10 Article 25 of
the UCMJ has largely remained the same. Even though servicemen
are now granted the full benefit of right to counsel" and trial by
military judge,'2 the convening authority's awesome control of the
trial by hand-picking the court members cannot be gainsaid. 3
7 NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1970, at 18.
8 Id. at 22.
9 See United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElvoy, 259 F.2d 927, 940 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (Burger, J.).
10 10 U.S.C. § 825, as amended (1968).
11 Id. § 827, as amended (1968).
12 Id. § 816(1) (b) (2) (c), as amended (1968).
18 In 1969, with approximately four million men under arms, there were 76,320
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
The UCMJ also makes available an appellate process. Once a
case is concluded at the trial level, it is sent back to the convening
authority for reconsideration.14 However, this procedure is generally
treated more as a clerical function than an inspection of judicial
proceedings. Furthermore, because he convened the court in the
first place, and then chose its members, it is unlikely that the
convening authority would revise the decision. From there, the
transcripts are sent to the next higher plateau, the Court of Military
Review.' 5 Finally, after the exhaustion of all other remedies, the case
goes to the United States Court of Military Appeals (USCMA).1
Here, three civilian judges, each appointed by the President for 15
year terms, make a final determination of the matter. It is the
responsibility of the court to interpret the UCMJ, and in the past,
it has been called the "Supreme Court ' 17 of military justice. It may
be important to note as well that normally the only way a court-
martial case is transferred from the military to the civilian system is
by a writ of habeas corpus.8 However, this seldom occurs.
Military justice today, under Article 25, is considerably more
genuine than it was in the past. Historically, the accused serviceman
has never been granted a trial by his peers. The first Articles of War
adopted almost verbatim the British Articles of War, including the
provision that stated: "A general court-martial ... shall not consist
of less than thirteen commissioned officers. . . ."' Several years later,
courts-martial (116 CONG. REC. 10,438 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1970)) in the Army alone.
The largest proportion of these were special courts-martial numbering 59,597 (116
CONG. REc. 10,439 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1970)). The courts-martial system is roughly a
three-layer structure at the trial level. Depending upon the seriousness of the offense
and the maximum corresponding punishment, a soldier is sent either to a summary,
special, or general court-martial. The general court-martial, although dealing with the
least number of cases, is the best known. It tries only major offenses and is em-
powered to impose life imprisonment and death penalties. Also, this is the court that
has tried the most publicized cases, such as that of Lieutenant William Calley (General
Court-Martial, United States v. Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr.), Lieutenant Henry
Howe (United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967)), Captain
Howard Levy (United States v. Levy, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 39 C.M.R. 672 (1967)), and
the Presidio Mutineers. For the purposes of this comment, the only basic difference be-
tween the procedures of the special and general courts-martial is the number of mem-
bers necessary to make up the court. The general court is a more populated tribunal.
14 10 U.S.C. § 862 (1950).
15 Id. § 866, as amended (1968).
16 Id. § 867 (1950).
17 Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 181, 188
(1962).
18 United States v. Burns, 346 U.S. 844 (1953); Application of Stapely, 246 F.
Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965), servicemen on active duty sufficiently "in custody" for pur-
poses of habeas corpus; Gann v. Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Augen-
blick v. United States, 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
19 See W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1896), American
Articles Of War Of 1776, art. I, sec. xiv, app. x, at 1489 (hereinafter cited simply as
WINTHROP) ; John Adams, a member of the Congressional Committee that drafted the
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that provision was amended to allow, under special circumstances, a
trial by as few as five officers.2" This proved to be the last such
revision until shortly after World War I.21
Until 1919, when Acting Judge Advocate General Samuel T.
Ansell spearheaded the first noticeable attempt at reform of the
provision, all courts-martial consisted exclusively of commissioned
officers. Ansell's proposals, offered to Congress by Senator Chamber-
lain and Congressman Royal Johnson,22 constituted a radical
departure from this caste-like procedure. It took into account the
intrinsic injustice of trying an enlisted man in an officer's court, and
suggested for the first time that enlisted men be also permitted a seat.
Under the Ansell plan, the private or the non-commissioned officer
tried in a general court-martial was guaranteed a court composed of
three-eighths privates or non-commissioned officers. In special
courts-martial, enlisted men were guaranteed a panel of one-third
men of equal rank. Unfortunately, for both the soldier and the sys-
tem, the provision was striken in Congress and was not included in
the newly formulated 1920 Articles of War.
The second major reform movement in this regard occurred
shortly after World War II when a victorious American Army
returned home telling tales of a wholly inadequate judicial system.
During the War, 1.7 million courts-martial executed 143 men and
left 45,000 American soldiers in prison stockades. 24 After extensive
study by several government committees,25 the Elston Act 26 was
passed in 1948, finally authorizing courts-martial to include enlisted
men. With the exception of various minor distinctions, Article 4 of
articles, reflected: "There was extant one system of articles of war which had carried
two empires to the head of mankind, the Roman and the British; for the British
articles were only a literal translation of the Roman. It would be in vain for us to
seek in our own inventions, or the records of warlike nations, for a more complete sys-
tem of military discipline ... " (3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 68 (C.F. Adams ed. 1850-
1856)).
20 See art. 1, American Articles Of War Of 1786, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra
note 19, app. xi, at 1504-1508.
21 See art. 64, American Articles Of War Of 1806, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra
note 19, app. xii, at 1517 (provision renumbered) ; art. 75, American Articles Of War
Of 1874, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 19, app. xiii, at 1532 (provision renum-
bered) ; Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, art. 5, 39 Stat. 650, 651 (provision renumbered).
22 S. Jour. 64, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., (1919), and H.R. JOUR. 367, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess., (1919).
23 Id.
24 NEwSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1970, at 20.
25 See Report Of The Secretary Of War's Board On Officer-Enlisted Man Rela-
tionships, S. Doc. No. 196, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 12 (1946) ; and Report Of The War
Department Advisory Committee On Military Justice, 14 J.B.A.D.C. 69, 18 (1947);
see also Schiesser, Trial By Peers: Enlisted Members On Courts-Martial, 15 CATHOLIC
U. L. REV. 171, 174-77 (1966).
26 62 Stat. 604, 628 (1948).
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the Elston Act and Article 25 of the current UCMJ, enacted two
years later, were the same.27 The experimentation of the Elston Act
proved a wise and successful reform. Although 150 years delinquent,
it afforded the serviceman the first step on the long road to securing
the right to a trial by an impartial jury.
As noted, the major effect of Article 4 and Article 2 5 has been
the inclusion of enlisted men on the court-martial panel. Neverthe-
less, both articles are limited. Special courts-martial consist of no
less than three members,2 8 and general courts-martial consist of no
less than five members.29 Under Article 2 5, the enlisted man brought
to trial is required to submit, well in advance of trial, a written
request to insure that at least one-third of the court is comprised
of other enlisted men."° Barring "military exigencies" or physical
impossibilities, the convening authority is compelled to comply. His
failure to do so requires "a detailed written statement, to be appended
to the record," wherein the convening authority explains why
enlisted men could not be obtained."' Notwithstanding this improve-
ment, of the over 75,000 men court-martialed in 1969, only 63 were
officers. 2 Strangely enough, it appears that those who are most often
defendants are least often tried by men who share common attitudes
and experiences.
In keeping with military tradition, officers are treated with more
consideration under Article 2 5. An officer can be tried only by fellow
officers, and none can be junior in rank except under unavoidable
circumstances. 3  All commissioned officers on active duty are eligible
to serve on courts-martial. 4 The only shortcoming they share with
an enlisted man facing trial is that the convening authority picks the
personnel of the court.35
Command influence is greatest when the convening authority
determines that a case should be tried and a court appointed.
Procedurally, a list of all eligible servicemen is compiled by the Staff
27 For a discussion of differences between art. 4 of the Elston Act and art. 25
of the UCMJ see F. WIENER, THE UNIFORm CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 85-6, 88
(1950).
28 10 U.S.C. § 816(2) (a), as amended (1968).
29 Id. § 816(1)(a).
30 Id. § 825(c).
31 Id.
32 116 CONG. REc. 12862, 12864-5 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1970).
33 10 U.S.C. § 825(d) (1) (1950) ; this provision also applies to enlisted men; how-
ever, for low ranking enlistees, it is practically valueless.
34 Id. § 825(a) (1950).
35 The military judge and members of the court may be challenged peremptorily
and for cause; see 10 U.S.C. § 841 (1950); see also Fuchsberg, Command Influence
On Military Justice, 7 Tam 36 (1971).
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Judge Advocate 6 and presented to the commander. 7 If an accused
has taken the "one-third enlisted man option," the convening
authority summons an appropriate number of enlisted men to insure
the proper composition of the court. The balance are officers in
either situation. Article 25 requires the convening authority to select
court members who "in his opinion, are best qualified for the duty by
reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and
judicial temperament." 8 He cannot select a member who is an ac-
cuser, a witness for the prosecution, or "has acted as investigating
officer or as counsel in the same case. "3' In addition, he is forbidden
to select an enlisted man from the same unit as the accused.4"
Aside from these restrictions, the convening authority is virtually
free to appoint whomever he pleases. It must be obvious that in well
publicized cases an adverse conclusion might disrupt the steadfast
standards of military discipline. The convenience of a hand-picked
court neatly disposes of that problem. And, unlike the civilian sys-
tem, only two-thirds of a military tribunal is necessary to return a
verdict of guilty.4
TRIAL BY PEERS: DOES ARTICLE 25 CREATE
A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION?
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution grants
the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. An "impartial jury,"
through years of judicial construction, is interpreted to mean a trial
by one's peers. The Supreme Court expounded upon this right in the
landmark decision of Witherspoon v. Illinois.42 Witherspoon held
that a trial by one's peers meant a trial by jury, chosen without
discrimination, from a cross-section of the community. Witherspoon,
however, was a civilian case referring to the civilian judicial process
created by Article III of the Constitution.43 But where does the
court-martial fit in? Do its members constitute a jury? Or, is it just
an ad hoc administrative proceeding? Does the same standard of
justice expounded in Witherspoon apply to courts-martial as well?
Is Article 25, then, a severe violation of that principle? In treatment
36 The Staff Judge Advocate is usually the convening authority's top legal advisor;
see generally 10 U.S.C. § 806 (1950).
37 Interview with Captain Thomas Faye, Office of Military Justice, Presidio, San
Francisco, Calif., Oct. 30, 1970; although this procedure is not codified, the Staff JAG
is usually responsible for securing lists of prospective court members.
38 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1950).
39 Id.
40 Id. § 825(c)(1), as amended (1968).
41 Id. § 852(a)(2); § 852(a)(1) (1950) (imposition of death penalty requires
unanimous vote).
42 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
43 U.S. CONST. art. Ill.
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of these issues, consideration should be given to the general prop-
osition of whether or not a serviceman has the right to a trial by
petit jury.
The controversy surrounding this problem seems to evolve
from a contradiction within the Constitution itself. Article I,
Section 8, Clause 14 gives Congress the power "To make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces .... ),44
Most authorities interpret this grant to mean that Congress has a
free hand in passing whatever laws it desires to govern the military.
Indeed, the UCMJ is an obvious by-product of that authority.
Moreover, according to Professor Seymour W. Wurfel,4" the
constitutional provision of Article III, Section 2, that "The Trial of
all crimes, except in cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury" does
not apply to military tribunals.4 ' Therefore, a court-martial, not
being an Article III court, is well within constitutional bounds in
permitting a base commander to choose anyone he pleases to sit on
the same court that he convenes. If, then, a military court is not a
court as we know it, what exactly is it? The general consensus of the
Wurfel school asserts that a court-martial is an independent ad hoc
tribunal, used for administrative purposes by the executive branch of
government. Within its own chambers, it can impose almost any
standards of justice necessary to preserve the discipline of the Armed
Forces.47
This point of view is arduously disputed by another school of
thought based predominently on the Bill of Rights. With the lone
exception of the grand jury clause of the fifth amendment, 8 where
does the Constitution exempt citizens under arms from the safe-
guards of the Bill of Rights? Living under conditions totally adverse
to the best principles of American democracy, should four million
servicemen pretend that the Constitution ceases to exist? Senator
Ervin of North Carolina, before passage of his Military Justice Act
of 1968, replied that no objective "should be more important than to
protect the constitutional rights of the servicemen and women who
are ever ready to protect the Constitution of the United States and
the Government established under it."'49
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
45 Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
46 Wurfel, Military Due Process: What Is It? 6 VAND. L. REv. 251, 281 (1953).
47 See Sherman, Judicial Review Of Military Determinations And The Exhaus-
tion O Remedies Requirement, 55 VIRC. L. REv. 483, 486 (1969) ; see also Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957) and Dynes v. Hoover, 20 U.S. 65 (How. 1857).
48 U.S. CONST. amend V.
49 Joint Hearings on S.745-762, S.2906, S.2907, Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and a Special Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1966).
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Indeed, advocates of a narrow construction of congressional
power in the regulation of the military cite the concise language of
the 1952 case of Burns v. Lovett: 50
The power of Congress to make rules for the armed forces is one of
a long list ...of powers conferred ...upon the Congress. We find
no intimation in the Constitution itself that Clause 14 of Section 8 of
Article I and proceedings thereto are exempt from the requirements and
prohibitions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. We think those Amend-
ments apply to each and all of the powers of Congress ...and to
all acts of executive officials ... and to judicial proceedings ... except
when an exception is stated in the Constitution itself.51
Despite the other ramifications of Burns, it is abundantly clear that
supporters of this concept construe all provisions of the Constitu-
tion within the framework of the entire document itself.52 They
contend that servicemen should be granted the right to a petit jury
even though, perhaps, a court-martial is not a court established under
Article III of the Constitution. The fifth amendment expressly states
that no one can be tried for a serious offense without a grand jury
indictment "except in cases arising in the land or naval forces." It
could be argued that because this specific exemption is so appreciably
isolated within the wording of the Constitution, that the original
framers in fact fully intended all other Bill of Rights safeguards to
apply to servicemen. The responses to this assertion are varied. One
source concludes that the failure to exempt servicemen from the
right to a petit jury was a possible oversight on the part of the
framers.5" The same source suggests that the framers intended the
fate of both the grand and petit juries to be the same.54
It is venturesome to speculate on the intentions of the framers
with respect to the serviceman and his right to a petit jury. Attention
must be focused instead on the law as it exists today. The Supreme
Court, in O'Callahan v. Parker,5 decided to extend the benefits of
grand jury indictments and petit juries to servicemen convicted of
non-service offenses. However, the Court, more than a quarter of a
century earlier, in Ex Parte Quirin,56 held that "[i] n ... light of...
50 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
51 Id. at 341.
52 See Comment, Military Justice And Due Process: Concerning The Rights Of
Representation And Judicial Review-An Analysis Of Kennedy v. Commandant And
Application Of Stapley, 2 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 326, 337 n. 63 (1969),
wherein "basis for that principle stems from the language of the Constitution proclaimed
as the 'Supreme law of the land.' U.S. CONST. art. VI.,
53 Henderson, Courts-Martial And The Constitution: The Original Understanding,
71 HARV. L. Rlv. 293, 305 (1957).
54 Id.
55 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
56 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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long continued and consistent interpretation we must conclude that§ 2 of Article III and the fifth and sixth amendments cannot be taken
to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military
commission. . . ."'I This opinion seemingly terminates the issue:
servicemen simply do not have the right to a trial by petit jury. In
the meantime, convictions from special and general courts-martial
remain federal convictions.5" Is it conceivable that in later years
the Supreme Court might reverse Quirin? That possibility grows
increasingly more realistic. It is too early to discern exactly what
role cases such as Augenblick v. United States,5" decided the same
year as O'Callahan, will play. Augenblick reaffirmed that the writ of
habeas corpus is the only collateral attack that a civilian court can
levy on a military determination. More importantly, the Court noted
in dictum that a defect of constitutional dimension might be grounds
for the attack.6
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has to date exercised a great
deal of restraint from penetrating the internal affairs of the military.
The Court has, as former Chief Justice Warren put it, "supported the
military establishment's broad power to deal with its own person-
nel."'" In conjunction, the law today seems to imply that the exemp-
tion of the fifth amendment right to a grand jury indictment inferen-
tially exempts servicemen from the right to petit juries also.62 In the
future, a more narrow interpretation of that inference may be forth-
coming, if cases such as O'Callahan and Augenblick are any
premonition. Otherwise, the reform processes of case law will rest
with the USCMA. A strict construction of Article 25 from the high-
est court of the military justice system might well topple the existing
citadel of injustice.
MILITARY DUE PROCESS: THE EVOLUTION OF A RIGHT?
The term "military due process" was coined by the USCMA in
United States v. Clay.63 The term is used to describe those rights set
out by the President in the Manual For Courts-Martial,O4 and by
the Congress in the UCMJ, subject to the continual interpretation
57 Id. at 40.
58 Interview with Captain Thomas Faye, supra note 37.
59 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
60 See interpretation by Chief Judge R. QUINN, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S.
COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS, at 9 (1969) (hereinafter cited simply as QUINN).61 Warren, The Bill Of Rights And The Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187
(1962).
62 J. SNEDEXER, MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE CODE, 446 (1953).
63 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
64 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (revised ed. 1969); (includes the UCMJ and
is the major reference book for military law).
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and application of the USCMA.6 5 Its intended purpose is to preserve
the fundamental fairness of the military trial.66 In theory, "military
due process" bears no connection to the Constitution. In practice,
however, many of the components of "military due process" closely
identify with their sister provisions in the Bill of Rights. Significantly,
"military due process" is solely a creation of the military judicial
system. The fine line separating it from the Constitution is best
stated in Clay by Judge Latimer when he said:
For our purposes, and in keeping with the principles of military justice
developed over the years, we do not bottom those rights and privileges
on the Constitution. We base them on the laws created by Congress.
But, this does not mean that we can not give the same legal effect to
the rights granted by Congress to military personnel as do civilian
courts to those granted to civilians by the Constitution or by other
federal statutes.67
The court in Clay explicitly pronounced a wide range of due
process rights.68 However, the right to a fair hearing by an impartial
court was not among them. A narrow interpretation of the rights
enumerated in Clay and those subsequently added to them might
leave the impression that the existent authority opposes any alter-
ation in the present method of appointing the court. On the whole,
the trend seems to indicate otherwise.
Conceivably, in the not so distant future, the "lost component"
of "military due process" may well become reality. 9 Over the years,
commanding generals have blatantly abused their appointment
powers. In the more obvious instances, the USCMA has taken a
firm stand in opposition. 70 Under Article 25, it is recalled, the
convening authority makes his appointments on the basis of age,
65 M. EDWARDs and C. DECKER, TnE SERVicEMAN AND THE LAW 91 (1955).
66 United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 77, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (1951).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 77-78, 1 C.M.R. at 77: "To be informed of the charges against him; to be
confronted by witnesses testifying against him; to cross-examine witnesses for the
government; to challenge members of the court for cause or peremptorily; to have a
specified number of members compose special and general courts-martial; to be repre-
sented by counsel; not to be compelled to incriminate himself; to have involuntary
confessions excluded from consideration; to have the court instructed on the elements
of the offense, the presumption of influence, and the burden of proof; to be found
guilty of an offense only when a designated number of members concur in a finding
to that effect; to be sentenced only when a certain number of members vote in the
affirmative; and to have an appellate review."
69 Quinn, The United States Court Of Military Appeals and Military Due Process,
35 ST. JoimE's L. REv. 215, 242 (1960): "An unbiased jury is, of course, sine qua non
for a fair hearing .... Even the most skilled and vigorous counsel is worth little
to an accused, if the trial is before a court that is prejudiced against him. Due process
demands a fair hearing."
70 See United States v. Clayton, 17 U.S.C.MA. 248, 38 C.M.R. 46 (1967) ; United
States v. Zagar, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 410, 18 C.M.R. 34 (1955).
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education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temp-
erament. In 1964, the case of United States v. Crawford7 upheld
the power of the convening authority to exclude lower ranking
enlisted men from appointment to courts-martial as long as his
selection process did not evince a systematic exclusion, and that the
court members eventually selected were those best qualified tojudge and sentence an accused. The result in Crawford was that one-
third of the court was comprised of senior non-commissioned officers.
Despite the fact that Crawford is good law today, the more apparent
difficulty goes to the heart of the failure of Article 25 itself. Under
this article, an inherent prejudice can exist in all military trials
because of the systematic exclusion of the young, the inexperienced,
and those with a minimal amount of service background. When
selecting members upon the basis of their judicial temperament, the
convening authority has the ability to turn the court into a well-
controlled panel of disciples.
The Crawford qualifications on Article 25 may have served
warning to convening authorities to exercise more discretion before
selecting court members. Even though the decision supported com-
manding generals, it made amply clear that future courts-martial
would be subject to reversal if they were arbitrarily stacked with
commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Prior to Crawford,
the USCMA had invalidated courts-martial because of the capri-
ciousness of the selection process,72 but the most recent decision
condemning the practice was the December, 1970, case of United
States v. Greene.7" In Greene, a court-martial was reversed when
proof established that the Staff Judge Advocate had requested of his
administrative division a list of potential court members consisting
solely of lieutenant colonels and above. Hence, wholly aside from the
fact that lieutenant colonels may have been the best qualified offi-
cers to man the court, the USCMA found a systematic exclusion and
nullified the court.
One can only wonder where decisions such as Greene will take
the court the next time it is called upon to construe the appointment
powers of Article 25. Will it continue to limit the convening author-
ity? One possibility is the often recalled axiom that when Congress
does not act to make long-needed changes, the courts do. 4 One need
only heed the caveat of the Clay case where, after specifying the first
71 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964).
72 See United States v. Hedges, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 642, 29 C.M.R. 458 (1960).
73 No. 23,042 U.S.C.M.A., Dec. 24, 1970.
74 W. LOCKHART, Y. KAinSAR, J. CHOPER, CONSTirUTIONAL LAW 1423 (1970).
[Vol. I1I
COMMENTS
"military due process" rights, the court cautioned that they were not
"intended... to be all inclusive. 75
CAPITOL HILL: THE MEANS FOR REFORM
Problem: An Inherent Injustice
The Constitution has endowed Congress with the power to make
all laws governing the military.7 In the last twenty years, Congress
has adopted and revised the UCMJ by making significant reforms
of the courts-martial system. Part of this movement may be
attributed to the slow-moving wheels of "military due process" as
administered by the USCMA in exposing case after case of military
injustice. But the more important part has resulted from political
pressure put to bear on our elected representatives. Conspicuously
absent from past reforms of the UCMJ is the total revision of Article
25.
The Military Justice Act of 1968 established a separate military
judiciary of qualified judges independent of the local base com-
mand.77 Coupled with this, Congress also made possible the right of
the serviceman to elect to be tried by a military judge alone.78
Initial reports, claims Chief Judge Quinn, indicate that 97 percent 79
of the accused in special courts-martial take advantage of this
procedure. The figure in general courts-martial is approximately
two-thirds.8 ° What are the implications of this? One military lawyer,
Captain Thomas Faye, defense counsel in the Presidio Mutiny Trials,
insists that statistics prove that the military judge is more apt to hand
out lighter sentences than a fully empanelled court-martial. Also, the
element of command influence is considerably decreased.8 ' The judge
has no official relationship to the base commander who convenes the
trial. His only responsibility is to the Judge Advocate General's
Office in Washington, D.C. Hence, when an enlisted man is con-
fronted with the choice of whether to be tried by a relatively unbiased
judge or by a court panel packed with non-commissioned officers, it
is no wonder why the former procedure is more popular.
The impetus of the Elston Act supposedly reduced command
influence. Enlisted men had finally transgressed class barriers and
75 United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 78, 1 C.M.R. 74, 78 (1951).
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
77 10 U.S.C. § 826, as amended (1968).
78 Id. § 816(b).
79 QuiNN, supra note 60, at 20.
80 Id.
81 Interview with Captain Thomas Faye, supra note 37.
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taken their rightful place on the court. At surface value, this reform
seems to be meaningful; but in practice, the results have been quite
the contrary. Almost without exception, when an enlisted man
chooses the Elston option he is faced with a court of officers and
non-commissioned officers, most of whom are career men. 2 One
notable example occurred during the Presidio Mutiny Trials. Defense
counsel Terrence Hallinan requested the one-third quota and was
accorded two senior sergeants and a young buck sergeant just
returned from Vietnam."
This creates a perplexing problem. With whom does the alle-
giance of the non-commissioned officer rest-the brass or the enlisted
men? Arguments exist for both positions. One source suggests that
common experiences with fellow enlisted men prompt non-comis-
sioned officers to vote more often for acquittal.8 4 Others contend that
their attitudes are more in tune with other career servicemen and,
therefore, more often return the guilty verdict.8 5 Despite the
disagreement, the most probable conclusion is that non-commissioned
officers occupy a class all of their own. This being true, low ranking
enlisted men, who make up the majority of those on trial, are not
afforded a trial by their peers; indeed, not even a trial by one-third
of their peers.
Theoretically, the accused officer is in a better position than the
accused enlisted man. On the average, he is well educated and is tried
by a court with much the same background. Nevertheless, this is not
always the rule. For instance, there was the 1967 court-martial of
Captain Howard Levy. 6 Levy, a physician, was originally brought to
trial for refusing to give Green Berets first aid instruction. But
beyond the implications of the formal charges, Levy was somewhat
of a controversial figure. He had long before fallen into disfavor
with Army officials who made no secret of the fact that they were
annoyed with his activities in the civil rights movement while
stationed in South Carolina. Court-martialed for wilful disobeyance
of an order, Levy's panel consisted of ten officers. All were white,
and seven of them were natives of South Carolina. Four were Viet-
nam combat veterans including one who had recently lost half his
82 F. GARDNER, THE UNLAWFUL CONCERT 127 (1969); see also an excellent discus-
sion of enlisted men on courts-martial in Schiesser, Trial By Peers: Enlisted Members
On Courts-Martial, 15 CATHOLIC L. REv. 171, 195-96 (1966).
83 Interview with Terrence Hallinan, San Francisco, Calif., Oct. 20, 1970.
84 Schiesser, Trial By Peers: Enlisted Members On Courts-Martial, 15 CATHOLIC
L. REV. 171 (1966).
85 Interview with Paul Halvonik, American Civil Liberties Union, San Francisco,
Calif., Oct. 22, 1970; interview with Terrence Hallinan, supra note 83; interview with
Captain Thomas Faye, supra note 37.
86 United States v. Levy, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 39 C.M.R. 672 (1967).
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face in battle.87 These "impartially chosen" court members prompted
Levy's defense counsel, American Civil Liberties Union attorney
Charles Morgan, to comment: "Any trial lawyer would trade every
procedural right in the Bill of Rights for the right to choose the
jury.' 88
These conditions, in the cases of both officers and enlisted men,
lead inevitably to the same bulwark; as long as the power to arbi-
trarily appoint court members rests with one individual, the con-
vening authority, an accused in the court-martial system has very
little chance of getting a fair trial. The answer is simple-reform is
needed. Although it is sometimes the least accessible, the most
acceptable method of reform is undoubtedly Congressional action.
Solution: A Random Selection
To best insure the impartiality of prospective courts-martial,
reformers should strive to duplicate the selection methods used in the
civilian jury system. There, the safest and most foolproof method
has been the selection of jurors at random.89 If a system such as this
were implemented in courts-martial, it would most assuredly have the
effect of removing a great deal of command influence from the trial.
Not surprisingly, though, the opposition to this type of proposal
from within the military is adamant. While defenders of the present
system concede that Article 25 compares unfavorably to methods
utilized in federal courts, they emphasize that civilian defendants
have no real guarantee of a trial by their peers. No doubt, random
selection does have its imperfections. But in spite of these, is it really
worthwhile to pursue the argument? A random selection of the court,
or jury, is manifestly a more just technique.
Another criticism is that random selection would cause height-
ened disruption and inconvenience within the administrative
workings of the command.9' The logic, or illogic, behind this view-
point is that in some way a random selection, rather than an arbi-
trary selection of court members, would cause grave difficulties in
the carrying on of normal military affairs. Probably the most credible
defense of all is that a random selection of court members would not
87 See Glasser, Justice And Captain Levy, 12 CoLum. FoRuM 47 (1969).
88 Id.
89 See general discussion of the jury selection in the federal courts system in Lind-
quist, An Analysis Of Juror Selection Procedure In The United States District Courts,
41 TEmp. L. Q. 32 (1967).
90 Comment, The Sword And Nice Subtleties Of Constitutional Law: O'Callahan
v. Parker, 3 LOYOLA L. Rav. 188, 201-2 (1969).
91 Everett, Military Justice Is To Justice As, 12 U.S.A.F. JAG L. REv. 212 (1970).
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conform to the traditional military caste system.92 Could a young
private, drafted into service and subjected to both mental and physi-
cal abuses never before experienced, adjudge a superior with the
necessary unbias of a trier of fact? In circumstances such as these,
could a commissioned or non-commissioned officer receive a fair
trial?
Professor Edward F. Sherman of Indiana University has offered
some acceptable replies to the military position. He sees the military
argument as threefold: (1) the military authorities believe that a
heavy majority of court members would be low ranking enlistees,
vengeful and too willing to convict their superiors; (2) but, on the
other hand, military officials seem to contradict themselves in con-
tending that "low ranking enlisted men might be overwhelmed by
the presence of officers on the court and therefore would not exert
their own independence; 98 and (3) low ranking enlisted men are too
inexperienced, the military believes, to understand the importance of
military discipline and would, consequently, be unqualified to sit as
court members.94 Very eloquently, Sherman responds:
These arguments actually go the heart of the jury system itself.
Permitting an accused to be tried by a jury of his peers chosen at
random always involves the possibility that jurors will be sympathetic
to the accused, swayed by other members of the jury, or that they will
not appreciate the purposes and objectives of the prosecution and
the criminal laws. These qualities, however, are only objectionable
if they prevent a juror from viewing a case with an open mind, and they
have a valuable function in insuring trial by jury whose members
reflect the different experiences, attitudes, and class prejudices found
in the community. The court-martial comprised solely of officers is
especially lacking in these qualities.95
In addition, Sherman calls attention to the third argument re-
garding the qualifications of enlistees with the retort that a substan-
tial percentage of them are in fact high school and college educated.96
In this respect, and with the limited amount of time one needs in the
service to "understand" discipline, they should be as capable as
anyone of appreciating the balance between justice and discipline
intrinsic to the system of military justice.
Professor Sherman is one of the few non-legislators to offer a
feasible alternative to Article 25. His solution is a compromise
92 Sherman, The Civilianization Of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REv. 3, 97-98
(1970).
93 Id. at 97.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 98.
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resembling that proposed by General Ansell9" over half a century
earlier. Taking into account the problems with the military caste
system, Sherman's recommendations are made in light of the
possibilities that younger enlistees may be "more class motivated
and less objective"98 than desirable. In essence, his proposal suggests
that court-martialed servicemen, whether they are officers or enlisted
men, should have the right to one-half the court, in both special and
general courts-martial, composed of men of their own rank. The
balance of the court would be officers. If the right is not invoked,
then the entire court would be drawn from a pool of eligible officers.
In all situations, Sherman emphasizes, court members should be
selected at random.99
In efforts to curb command influence, the Congress of the
United States has finally reacted after years of indifference and has
begun the proper steps to bring about reform. In the summer of 1970,
Senators Birch Bayh'00 and Mark Hatfield1 ' each proposed separate
legislation to amend Article 25. Senator Joseph Tydings' 012 had done
the same in November of 1969. All three reform measures were
based on the principle of random selection. And, all three were either
part of more inclusive bills or were accompanied by other bills
having the same effect.
The Hatfield bill, °3 dealing with the reconstruction of Article
25, is almost a duplicate of Professor Sherman's plan. Aside from
various minor differences, the bill essentially guarantees the same
rights .10 4
The Tydings bill'05 is slightly different. It makes no provision
for any discrimination between officers and enlisted men, and calls
for a Circuit Judicial Officer to "select at random the members of the
court from among those officers and enlisted men who are eligible
and available within the circuit." 06 The major failure of the Tydings
amendment, however, is that it is designed for general courts-martial
only. 0 7 For some reason, Senator Tydings chose not to include
97 See text accompanying note 22, supra.
98 Sherman, The Civiianization O Military Law, 22 MAm L. Rlv. 3, 98 (1970).
99 Id. at 98-99.
100 S.4191, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., (1970).
101 S.4169, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., (1970).
102 S.3117, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., (1969).
103 S.4169-4178, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., (1970).
104 See 116 CONG. REC. 12,666, 12,670-71 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1970) wherein S.4169 is
reprinted.
105 See 115 CONG. REc. 33,011 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings), wherein
S.3117 is reprinted.




special courts-martial in his revision. This effectively eliminates the
overwhelming number of cases. The rationale behind such a moderate
approach to the problem may have been political.
The defect in the Tydings bill was recognized and remedied in
Senator Bayh's proposed Military Justice Act of 1970.1°8 An all-
inclusive bill, the proposed statute provides for a total random selec-
tion of court members for both general and special courts-martial. It,
too, fails to discriminate in any way between officers and enlisted
men. One major difference between this bill and the others is that it
restores a built-in eligibility requirement of at least one year on
active duty. 9
Senator Bayh's revision of Article 25 is certainly the most
innovative reform measure offered. It most closely resembles the
federal system of selecting jurors, and, unlike the other proposals, is
not a compromise solution. It is testimonial to the ideals of fair play
and justice under military law. Any other solution falls short of that
mark. Although most court members under the Bayh amendment
would be enlisted men, the vast majority of defendants fall under the
same class or category. Given the opportunity, this stratum of
military society could be as objective as any other while sitting in
judgment of fellow servicemen. Both higher educational backgrounds
and increased experience in the courts-martial process would
eventually mold a corps of enlisted men capable of understanding
military necessity and qualified to adjudge their military peers
accordingly. This process, in conjunction with the one-year active
duty requirement, would insure the proper safeguards for officers on
the few occasions that they face courts-martial. In time, the
intentional or unintentional vindictiveness of the enlisted man for
his superiors would soon be replaced by greater forces of individual
respect and responsibility.
The Hatfield and Bayh amendments, if passed, would do a
good deal to furnish servicemen with a fair and impartial trial. Both,
significantly, dispense with command influence in hand-picking the
court, and yet, both are reasonable pieces of legislation in light of the
gross inequities of Article 25. Whether or not Congress acts on them
may be an altogether different matter. Each bill, after its initial intro-
duction on the floor of the Senate, was sent to the Armed Forces
Committee.'" In committee, no action was taken and the bills died.
108 See 116 CONG. REc. 12,862, 12,866 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1970) wherein S.4191
is reprinted.
109 See 116 CONG. Rc. 12,862, 12,869 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1970).
110 116 CoNG. REc. 12,666, 12,669 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1970) ; 116 CoNG. REc. 12,862
(daily ed. Aug. 6, 1970).
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However, both Senators reportedly intend to reintroduce their bills
in the 92nd Congress, hopefully to meet a more enthusiastic and
favorable reception."' The political implications surrounding these
bills are many, and speculation as to their possibilities of becoming
law would be impractical.
CONCLUSION
Major General Kenneth J. Hodson, Judge Advocate General of
the United States Army, recently commented: "Military justice is as
good or better than the justice in 48 of the 50 states."" 2 This
statement is typical of those who defend the courts-martial system.
It should be clear that this sort of thinking cannot prevail if an
ailing, outdated, and unfair system of justice is to keep stride with its
civilian counterpart. Indeed, the de facto jury structure of the
military justice system is wholly inadequate by today's standards.
The coveted benefits of a fair and impartial trial are not realities for
four million American servicemen. The power of the convening
authority to appoint at will members of courts-martial is a regrettable
contradiction of all notions of fairness existent within our judicial
tradition. The keeper of that evil, Article 25 of the UCMJ, is overdue
for a revision.
It would appear at this juncture that Article 25 is safe from
constitutional attack. The Supreme Court held in Ex Parte Quirin,"'
almost a third of a century ago, that courts-martial are not Article
III courts, and the right to demand a trial by petit jury is not
applicable to servicemen. 114
Change must occur by either of two means: (1) the USCMA
must narrowly interpret Article 25 to bring the full force of "military
due process" to bear on convening authorities; or (2) by the power
of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, Congress should amend Article 25
of the UCMJ to expressly prevent the capricious selection of court
members.
Congressional action is the most desirable means for change.
But, it is also the most fickle. History teaches that legislators seldom
act without the mandate of public expression, and, consequently,
reform of the military legal system has nearly always followed war.115
"'l Information obtained in conversation with the Senate Offices, Washington,
D.C., of Senators Bayh and Hatfield, Nov. 2, 1970.
112 NEWSWEEK, supra note 7, at 22.
113 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
114 Id. at 40.




The best possible way to insure servicemen a trial by peers is
to institute one of several variations of the random selection plan in
place of Article 25. The most suitable substitute is included in
Senator Bayh's Military Justice Act. It virtually eliminates command
influence in providing a more equitable method of selecting court
members. Furthermore, the element of discipline necessary to the
orderly functioning of the military community would not be
endangered. The convening authority still retains his powers of
non-judicial punishment.' Also, as Senator Bayh asserts, ". . . ex-
perience has taught us that inequitable laws spawn disrespect and
eventually lead to disobedience. '117
It was once observed that "fairness and impartiality on the part
of the triers of fact constitute a cornerstone of American justice."'18
The most convenient instrument to render that ideal a reality for
servicemen is manifestly borne by Congress. Accordingly, it should
begin work to prevent the continuation of the present travesty of
justice.
G. Edward Rudloff, Jr.
116 116 CONG. Rxc. 10,442, 10,443 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1970).
117 Id.
118 See United States v. Deain, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 49, 17 C.M.R. 44, 49 (1954).
